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Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in
the People's Republic of China
Daniel C.K. Chow*
'Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A., 1979, Yale Col-
lege; J.D. 1982, Yale Law School. From 1997-99, I was on academic leave and served as in-
house legal counsel for a large multinational enterprise with significant investments in
China. During this period, I lived in Guangzhou, which is located along China's southeast-
em border near Hong Kong. My daily work consisted of all general commercial and busi-
ness matters, but I began to focus a great deal of my time on intellectual property matters
because of the seriousness of the trademark counterfeiting and infringement problems that
we were experiencing. During this period, I helped to organize the China Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition, an ad hoc group of multinational companies with serious counter-
feiting problems in China. I served as Secretary for the Coalition from 1998-99 and was in-
volved in doing research and in drafting papers on counterfeiting for the Coalition. I also
participated in actual enforcement work against counterfeiters and was present at numerous
meetings with enforcement officials. I was also present at raids of suspected counterfeiters
and was allowed to examine goods, documents, equipment, and the suspect premises. In
some cases, I was able to sit in on interrogations of suspected counterfeiters. In other in-
stances, I was able to have contact with suspected counterfeiters in less formal settings
through the use of various subterfuges, including the use of false identities.
In the fall of 1999, after my return to full-time teaching at Ohio State, I helped to organ-
ize and coordinate an exchange on enforcement against counterfeiting under the auspices of
the United States Department of State. The first phase of this exchange occurred from No-
vember 6-17, 1999 and involved a delegation of US legal experts, including two federal
judges, a federal prosecutor, and a special agent of the FBI. This exchange involved meet-
ings in the People's Republic of China ("PRC") with high level Chinese enforcement offi-
cials at which the Chinese asked a number of questions and engaged the delegation in
numerous exchanges. I also helped to organize and coordinate the second phase of this ex-
change, which involved a visit by a delegation of Chinese government officials to the United
States from May 6-14, 2000. I accompanied the Chinese delegation on visits to various fed-
eral agencies, trade associations, and US headquarters of several multinational companies
with substantial China businesses. These visits resulted in frank and detailed discussions of
issues related to enforcement against counterfeiting. Many of the issues raised in these ex-
changes are reflected in this Article and it is hoped that this Article can serve as a basis for
further exchanges and dialogue on these issues. Although I have served in a number of dif-
ferent roles in China in the past several years, the views expressed here do not represent
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I. INTRODUCTION
Trademark and product counterfeiting has now become a major con-
cern for many brand owners doing business in the People's Republic of
China.2 Estimates by some multinational companies are that counterfeiting
in China results in losses in the billions, if not tens of billions, of dollars
each year to their businesses, and causes serious and possibly irreparable
harm to the goodwill and reputation of their brands. Chinese brand owners
face counterfeiting problems that are as severe, if not more so, than those
plaguing multinational companies. The recent dramatic increase in exports
of counterfeit goods produced in China to countries abroad now raises the
concern for some companies that China has become a platform for a global
counterfeiting problem.5 Although China already has the most significant
those of any organization, entity, or group with which I was affiliated. These views are my
own.
Thanks to Dean Gregory H. Williams for his support on this project and my endeavors
concerning China. Thanks also to Mr. Seung Baik, Editor-in-Chief, of the Northwestern
Journal of International Law & Business for asking me to submit this Article and to Ms.
Michele Kunitz, Executive Editor, for her helpful comments and editing. Thanks also to Mr.
Craig Bryson for his research assistance.
'The focus of this Article is on trademark counterfeiting, which should be distinguished
from other types of intellectual property violations. For further discussion of the differences
between counterfeiting and copyright piracy, see infra text accompanying notes 7-12; see
also Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q.
1, 8-10 (2000).2According to one source, "[f]oreign companies are being eaten alive by counterfeiters in
China." Stuck in the Middle, Bus. CHINA, Dec. 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2498141.3There is no scientific method to measure the size of the counterfeiting problem in
China. Counterfeiters operate their illegal trade in underground factories and through crimi-
nal organizations. As a result, only partial information is available and some extrapolations
must be made, but based on available information, the size of China's consumer economy
($352.7 billion in annual sales), the percentage of total sales reported to be lost from counter-
feiting from industry groups (15-20% for some brands), total losses suffered to counterfeit-
ing by US companies worldwide ($200 billion), and China's role as a leading source of
counterfeit products-it is reasonable to assume that the total value of counterfeit products
that are available in or originating from China are in the billions or even tens of billions of
dollars per year. See Chow, supra note 1, at 11-12; see also David Murphy, Fake Goods at
Critical Levels in China, Bus. TIMES, June 21, 1999, at 5. Estimated annual losses for some
well-known companies doing business in China include $150 million (Procter & Gamble),
$70 million (Nike), and $24 million (Unilever). See id.
4See Chow, supra note 1, at 13; see also Joseph T. Simone, Countering Counterfeiters,
CHINABUS. REv. Jan.1, 1999, at 12, available in 1999 WL 11878204.
5 See Chow, supra note 1, at 10-11; see also Defenders of the Mark: Companies Battle
the Global Trade in Counterfeit and Stolen Goods, 9 CoRp. LEGAL TIMES 97 (1999) (noting
that counterfeits made in China are found in more than 100 countries around the world
(statement by Harley I. Lewin, intellectual property law expert)).
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counterfeiting problem in world history, counterfeiting seems to be still on
6the rise.
As used in this Article, counterfeiting refers to the unauthorized act by
one party of passing off exact duplicates of products with trademarks
owned by another party. Counterfeiting should be distinguished from
copyright piracy, which refers to the unauthorized copying of the content of
a fixed medium of expression, such as films, musical recordings, and com-
6See, e.g., Stuck in the Middle, supra note 2, at 1 (China's intellectual property infringe-
ment problems already "exceed[s] the worst fears of most foreign investors," but "the
[counterfeiting] situation seems to be getting worse, not better."); China: Crackdown on
Fakes Intensifies, CI-INA DAILY, Mar. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7594529 ("In spite of
the legislative amplification, the fake-making business seems to still be booming and has
even been upgraded.").
7 China does not have a law that specifically defines counterfeiting. Rather, counterfeiting
is subsumed within the more general wrong of trademark infringement. Article 38, PRC
Trademark Law provides:
Any of the following acts shall be an infringement of the exclusive right to use a registered trade-
mark:
(1) To use a trademark which is identical or similar to the registered trademark in respect of the same
or similar goods without the authorisation of the proprietor of the registered trademark;
(2) To sell goods while knowing that a fake trademark is being passed off as a registered
trademark.
(3) To forge or make, without authorisation, representations of the registered trademark of another
person, or to sell forged representations or representations made without authorisation of the regis-
tered trademark.
(4) To cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right to use the registered trademark of an-
other person.
TRADEMARK LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (REVISED) (Zhonghua Renmin
Gonghe Guo Shangbiao Fa (Xiuzhen), Di Sanshiba Tiao) (adopted at the 24' Session of the
Standing Committee of the 5th National People's Congress on August 23, 1982, revised by
the 30 ' Session of the Standing Committee of the 7 National People's Congress on Febru-
ary 22, 1993, and effective July 1, 1993) art. 38 (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Trademark Law"].
The catch-all provision referring to causing prejudice to the exclusive trademark right of an-
other person contained in Article 38(4) above is explained by Article 41 of the Trademark
Law Implementing Regulations, which provides:
Any of the following acts will constitute an infringement of the exclusive right to use a registered
trademark as referred to in item (4) of Article 38 of the Trademark Law:
(1) dealing in goods which were known or ought to have known to have infringed the exclusive right
of another person to use a registered trademark;
(2) using, as a product name or label, written script or a design which is identical or similar to the
registered trademark of another person who uses it on the same or similar commodities, with the
similarity being sufficient to cause confusion;
(3) intentionally providing storage, transport, postage or harbouring offenders in order to facilitate
the infringement of the exclusive right of another person to use a registered trademark.
TRADENMARK LAW IMPLEMENTING RULES (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shangbiao Fa
Shishi Xize, Di Sishiyi Tiao) (promulgated May 12, 1995) art. 41 [hereinafter "PRC Trade-
mark Law Implementing Rules"].
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puter software.8 In the recent past, a great deal of attention has been fo-
cused on China's production of pirated compact and videodisks, videotapes,
and cassette tapes.9 Most of these violations involve copyright piracy in
which no effort is made by the infringer to pass off the pirated product as
produced or distributed by the original copyright owners.10 By contrast,
counterfeiting involves an attempt to pass off the counterfeit as an authentic
product by creating a fake product that appears in all respects identical to
the authentic product, including using the same trade dress and including
the name and address of the manufacturer on the product.1 Issues of prod-
8Liability for copyright infringement is set forth in Article 45 of the PRC Copyright Law.
COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo
Zhuduo Quanfa) (adopted at the 15'h Session of the Standing Committee of the 70, National
People's Congress on September 7, 1991 and effective June 1, 1991) art. 45 (PRC) [herein-
after "PRC Copyright Law"].
9Disputes between the United States and China over copyright protection in the early
1990s almost led to a trade war. See Robert B. Frost, Jr. Intellectual Property Rights Dis-
putes in the 1990s Between the Republic of China and the United States, 4 TUL J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 119 (1995). For a review of the copyright negotiations between the US and China,
see id; see also, Marcus W. Brauchli, Shenfei Stake Stirs Thorny U.S. Issue that Foreign
Firms May Abet Theft, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1995, available in 1995 WL-WSJA
2131402; Joseph T. Simone, Damming the Counterfeit Tide: New Laws Promise Foreign
Trademark Owners Much-Needed Protection, CHINA Bus. REv., Nov. 1, 1993, available in
1993 WL 10862142. The dispute now appears to be resolved because of China's nationwide
crackdown on copyright piracy. See, e.g., Duncan Hughes, Copyright Pirates Face Big
Penalties as Laws Get Tough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 27, 1995, available in 1995
WL 7528438.
"°Consumers who buy pirated copyrighted goods, such as computer software, compact
disks, or videotapes want the content of the product. So long as the content of the product
has been duplicated at a high level of quality (easily done with modem technology), these
consumers generally are not concerned whether the product is actually manufactured by the
copyright owner. Indeed, many consumers in China believe that inexpensive pirated copy-
righted goods provide an important benefit to the consumer because so many consumers
would be unable to buy the more expensive genuine product. Many of these consumers are
also fully aware that they are buying a pirated product. In the case of counterfeit goods,
however, many consumers are deceived by what they purchase and fewer consumers believe
that such counterfeit goods serve the interests of consumers. At the same time, there does
appear to be a less affluent segment of the Chinese population that will knowingly purchase
counterfeit goods. These consumers believe that many counterfeit goods are of at least equal
quality to local brands but carry a prestige that local brands lack. Also some consumers who
knowingly purchase counterfeit goods will adjust their usage of the goods accordingly. For
example, a consumer will use a counterfeit detergent to wash work clothes but not bed sheets
and a counterfeit soap to wash his hands but not his face.
"Counterfeiting should also be distinguished from other less serious forms of trademark
infringement, which involve partially copying the trademark and the package design of an-
other party. In most cases, illegal and unlicensed underground factories manufacture coun-
terfeits, whereas other types of less serious trademark infringements are committed by lawful
and licensed enterprises. Trademark infringement in China is also a serious problem but is
generally viewed as less harmful by brand owners. Moreover, counterfeiting on any scale is
criminal activity, whereas trademark infringement is generally an administrative or civil
matter.
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uct quality are not generally at stake in copyright piracy cases because
modem technology allows for copies that are in many cases identical in
quality to that of the original. Product quality and consumer rights can be
an issue where counterfeit products are involved because the counterfeiter
often seeks to pass off a product of lesser quality in the guise of a well-
known brand name. 2
Many visitors to China often are surprised by the plentiful supply of
counterfeit goods in obvious and open display in China's many street mar-
kets, wholesale markets, and small and medium sized retail establishments.
For example, in Silk Alley, located next to the United States Embassy in
Beijing, street hawkers do a brisk business in selling counterfeits of many
famous trademarks, including some American brands, to passers-by in plain
view of the US Embassy. In downtown Beijing, a large wholesale market
sells counterfeit goods right in the heart of the city, located in a densely
populated area next to hotels, businesses, and residential sections and the
offices of numerous government enforcement authorities. All over China,
this scenario seems to be repeated in both large urban areas and in the
smaller (by China's standards) mid-sized cities and also in China's many
vast rural areas.
This situation causes significant frustration and consternation for many
foreign and local brand owners, many of which are struggling to turn a
profit in an increasingly competitive and difficult business environment.'
3
Some foreign and local brand owners in China now spend several hundred
thousand to several million dollars annually on enforcing their rights
against counterfeiters. 4 Brand owners have no difficulty in identifying and
locating manufacturers and sellers or in bringing enforcement actions.' 5
12For a discussion of consumer issues associated with counterfeiting, see Chow, supra
note 1, at 12-13.
13Some multinational investors have learned some sobering lessons since the almost
euphoric days of the 1980s and have had to scale back expectations and to rethink their
China strategies for the long-term. A common expression used by the Chinese to describe
relations between a foreign investor and its local Chinese partner is "same bed, different
dreams." Many local partners are state-owned enterprises run by life-long Communist Party
members who have little understanding of free market principles. On the other side, some
foreign investors may be prone to cultural bias and feelings of superiority. Differences in
management styles and management goals also create conflicts. For a general discussion of
lessons learned, see Daniel C.K. Chow, The Limited Partnership Joint Venture Model in the
People's Republic of China, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1998); Daniel C.K. Chow, Re-
organization and Conversion of a Joint Venture into a Wholly-Foreign Owned Enterprise in
the People's Republic of China, 73 TUL. L. REv. 619 (1998). For a penetrating analysis of
one of the earliest joint ventures in China and its many travails, see JIM MANN, BEIJING JEEP:
A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN BUSINESS IN CHINA (1997).
14This observation is based upon the author's numerous discussions with multinational
companies doing business in China and based upon the author's own experience.
15In some instances, the local joint venture partner or others within the foreign investor's
organizations (including distributors or suppliers) in China may be involved directly or indi-
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Rather, as alluded to above, the targets can be so numerous that brand own-
ers, given budget constraints, have to be selective in how many enforcement
actions they seek to bring in any period. 16 There is no lack of raids and sei-
zures of counterfeit goods, but brand owners are routinely frustrated by the
lack of resulting penalties and sanctions that effectively punish counterfeit-
ers and create deterrence against recidivism. 17 In addition, brand owners
have been lobbying for several years now for increased criminal sanctions
in the form of convictions and imprisonment only to find that achieving
criminal sanctions continues to be rare and difficult. 8 In China today, it is
simply the case that counterfeiting has become a very lucrative trade for
some, and that many counterfeiters simply do not fear the consequences of
being caught and punished.19 In many instances, counterfeiters may view
law enforcement as a cost of doing business.20
The reasons for the lack of effective enforcement and deterrence are
complex and varied and a comprehensive discussion of all of these reasons
is beyond the scope of this Article.21 Rather, this Article focuses on issues
relating to the interpretation and enforcement of China's current laws
against counterfeiting, and on several systemic features of China's legal and
administrative system relating to enforcement of intellectual property rights.
In recent years, China has enacted a number of laws designed to protect in-
tellectual property rights of all kinds, in part due to pressure from the
United States.22 Although China's current set of laws still appears to con-
rectly in counterfeiting. This creates issues of internal corporate security for the foreign in-
vestor and lie outside the scope of this Article. However, based upon the author's experi-
ence, involvement of persons within the foreign investor's own organization in
counterfeiting is not an uncommon occurrence in China.16Many brand owners find that fees and expenses for raid actions can quickly mount up,
without any significant results. See Anupa P. Mathew, News From the United Arab Enir-
ates: Electrical Industry Fights Counterfeiting, GULF NEWs, Dec. 18, 1999, at 1.
17See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
18 See infra text accompanying note 75.
19For a discussion of penalties and sanctions, see infra text accompanying notes 41-52 &
63-75.20For a review of the average fines and penalties imposed in counterfeiting cases, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 44-45.
21A major problem not examined in this Article is local protectionism, which refers in
this context to the protection afforded to counterfeiters by local government enforcement en-
tities. Local protectionism is more of a social and political problem, as opposed to a problem
of interpretation and enforcement of laws. For a detailed examination of local protectionism
and its role in the growth of counterfeiting, see Chow, supra note 1, at 21-25.
22See, supra note 7, for a list of intellectual property rights protection laws. For addi-
tional laws, see also ADMINISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS IN FOREIGN TRADE PROVISIONS
(Duiwai Maoyi Jinji Heduo Ji Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Ju Guanyu Duiwai Maoyi
Zhong Shangbiao Guangli De Guiding) (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Co-operation ("MOFTEC") and the State Administration for Industry and Com-
merce ("SAIC") on May 12, 1995 and effective August 1, 1995) (PRC); RECOGNITION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF WELL-KNoWN TRADEMARKS TENTATIVE PROVISIONS (Chiming Shang-
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tain some gaps, the central issue today is not with a lack of adequate legal
weapons but with the interpretation, application, and enforcement of the law
through the use of a massive bureaucratic government and regulatory
structure in place before China's current reforms were launched. This Arti-
cle addresses these issues.
Although the discussion in this Article is limited to counterfeiting in
China, many of the issues discussed are endemic to the Chinese legal sys-
tem as a whole, and apply also to other intellectual property rights, such as
copyright piracy and patent infringements.23 Moreover, many of the themes
raised in this Article also illuminate the current state of the nascent Chinese
legal system as a whole and how its capacity is tested as it continues the
struggle to keep pace with China's many economic reforms and accompa-
nying social changes. 24 Part I of this Article begins with a review of the en-
forcement system against counterfeiting in China and examines the legal
problems that prevent more effective enforcement in China.2 5 After re-
viewing China's current issues, this Part will then analyze and suggest dif-
ferent ways of viewing and handling some of the same issues, based in
some measure on United States law and practice.26 No attempt is made here
to criticize the Chinese government for its current efforts in enforcing
trademark rights against counterfeiting. Rather, this Article is intended to
present China with some alternative ways of viewing and handling some of
these difficult issues and to serve as a basis for exchange and dialogue be-
tween the United States and China. Part I concludes with some observa-
tions about the future of counterfeiting in China.
biao Rending He Guanli Zhanxing Guiding) (promulgated by SAIC on August 14, 1996 and
immediately effective) (PRC); COMPUTER SOFTVAPE PROTECTION RULES (Jisuanji Ranjian
Baohu Tiaoli) (passed by the State Council on May 24, 1991, promulgated June 4, 1991, and
effective October 10, 1991) (PRC); PATENT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(REviSED) (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhuanli Fa (Xiuzheng)) (amended at the 4"h Ses-
sion of the Standing Committee for the 6
th National People's Congress on March 12, 1984,
and also amended by decision adopted at the 27 h Session of the Standing Committee of the
7"h National People's Congress on September 4, 1992) (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Patent
Law']; IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS OF THE PATENT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhuanli Fa Shishi Xize) (adopted by the State
Council on December 12, 1992 and promulgated by the Patent Office of the People's Re-
public of China on December 21, 1992) (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Patent Law Implementing
Rules"].
23 Counterfeiting is generally viewed by brand owners as the most serious of their intel-
lectual property problems. See Stuck in the Middle, supra note 2, at 1.
24For a general review of China's economic reforms and China's attempts to adjust and
keep pace, see Daniel C.K. Chow, An Analysis of the Political Economy of China's Enter-
prise Conglomerates: A Study of the Reform of the Electric Power Industry in China, 28
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 383 (1997).
2sSee infra text accompanying notes 36-56, 63-75 & 93-95.
26See infra text accompanying notes 57-62, 76-92.
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II. THE PRC ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
Because China's enforcement system places a heavy emphasis on ad-
ministrative enforcement, the discussion below begins with a review of this
area.27 Criminal and civil enforcement have not played significant roles in
enforcement against counterfeiting, but there may be more activity in these
areas in the future as brand owners press for change. The following discus-
sion can be divided into three main areas: administrative, criminal, and civil
enforcement.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
Administrative enforcement power over counterfeiting in China is cur-
rently not centralized in a single entity, but is divided among a number of
different administrative entities. The Administration of Industry and Com-
merce ("AIC") has primary jurisdiction over trademarks, including matters
of registration, administration and enforcement.28 Another administrative
body, the Technical Supervision Bureau ("TSB") has authority over product
quality and consumer protection issues, and as a result, also has enforce-
ment power over counterfeit goods.29 In some instances, brand owners can
also seek enforcement from the Patent Administration Office, based upon
its jurisdiction over patent rights,30 and from the General Administration of
Customs, based upon its jurisdiction over China's national borders, where
imports or exports of counterfeit products are involved .
China's numerous enforcement options can be traced to certain fea-
tures of the pre-reform government regulatory structure still in place today.
China divides the economy into vertical sectors and assigns complete
authority over a sector to an administrative body. Thus, the AIC has full
authority within its sector over trademarks, among other industrial and
commercial activities, including the power of enforcement for breach of
27In this context, administrative enforcement refers to actions by a government regula-
tory body that has supervisory and administrative power over an economic sector. This
should be contrasted with the work of the police, prosecutors, and courts, which do not ad-
minister and regulate economic sectors.
28See, PRC Trademark Law, art. 1, 2 & 38; PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules,
art. 42.
29 See PRODUCT QUALITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zhonghua Renmin
Gonghe Guo Chanpin Zhilinag Fa ) (promulgated Feb. 22, 1993 and effective Sept. 1, 1993)
art. 12 (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Product Quality Law"]; PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zonghua Renmin
Gonghe Guo Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa) (promulgated Oct. 31, 1993 and effective Jan. 1,
1994) art. 34 (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Consumers Law"].30See PRC Patent Law, art. 60; PRC Patent Law Implementing Regulations, art. 77.
3
1 See CUSTOMS LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zonghua Renmin Gonghe
Guo Haiguan Fa) (adopted by the 19'h Session of the Standing Committee of the 6t" National
People's Congress on Jan. 22, 1987 and effective July 1, 1987) Arts. 3 & 4 [hereinafter
"PRC Customs Law"].
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trademark rights.32 The TSB has authority over all areas concerning product
quality and consumer rights and has the power to deal with counterfeits be-
cause many counterfeit products are of inferior quality and implicate con-
sumer fraud, health, and safety.33  The same holds for the Patent
Administration Office and the General Customs Administration of Cus-
toms-these entities also have authority over counterfeiting that can be
traced to their full authority over the vertical economic sectors that they
regulate and administer.34
Counterfeiting often cuts across several vertical sectors, and as a result,
a number of parallel enforcement actions through different enforcement en-
tities can arise. Although this system of parallel enforcement entities raises
some long-term issues of efficiency for China, many brand owners actually
prefer to have the current system involving a number of parallel and com-
peting enforcement authorities because of the many options that it offers.35
1. Raids and Seizures
An administrative enforcement action normally involves a raid con-
ducted by enforcement officials of the counterfeiter's premises and a sei-
36
zure of counterfeit goods, labeling, packaging, and equipment.
Administrative entities have authority to initiate enforcement actions on
their own, but such actions require the identification and location of a target
counterfeiter. Because many enforcement entities lack the personnel and
resources to conduct on-going investigations, the number of actions initi-
ated by enforcement authorities is limited and makes up only part of their
overall enforcement activities. Many brand owners hire investigative agen-
cies to track down and locate counterfeiters and then bring such information
in the form of a complaint before administrative enforcement authorities.37
32See PRC Trademark Law, art. 38.
33See PRC Product Quality Law, art 12; PRC Consumers Law, art. 34.
34See PRC Patent Law; PRC Customs Law, arts. 3 & 4.35 For the long term, a centralized agency administering a national trademark law and
practice is probably a better use of China's resources.36For powers of the AICs to confiscate and destroy materials used in connection with
counterfeiting, see PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 43.37These investigations are conducted by professional investigative agencies hired by
brand owners. Most companies are reluctant to do this type of work themselves because the
work can be dangerous and there are reports of instances of counterfeiters assaulting under-
cover operatives whose identities are discovered. A thriving and lucrative industry in intel-
lectual property investigations now exists in Mainland China and in Hong Kong. The costs
of a typical investigation, depending on its degree of difficulty, can range from $1000-
$5000. Fees for arranging and conducting an enforcement action through the authorities add
an additional $2000-$3000. If the brand owner also engages legal counsel for the raid, this
will add another S2,000-$3,000. In total, a typical raid action will cost between $8,000-
$10,000. Given that some brand owners can conduct as many as two or three raids each
week, the costs quickly mount. To cut some costs, some brand owners have attempted to
internalize some of this work by hiring in-house counsel, but the nature of the work, and its
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Once the brand owner has located the counterfeiter, the brand owner
will then file a complaint before the administrative authorities at the appro-
priate time.3' Timing is important; most brand owners seek to catch manu-
facturers of counterfeit goods in the act of manufacturing the product or
sellers of counterfeit goods with stocks of counterfeits on the premises in
order to facilitate criminal and administrative prosecutions. As a result,
these investigations can be time consuming and dangerous since the most
effective means of investigation involves introducing an operative who as-
sumes a false identify and infiltrates the counterfeiter's inner circles and
operations.
Once the brand owner decides to act and file a complaint, the authori-
ties often act swiftly.39 In many instances, within minutes of the filing of a
complaint by the brand owner, administrative authorities will organize a
raid and seizure action.40 The brand owner and its investigators who know
the location of the counterfeiter will often then accompany the authorities
on the raid action. Once at the premises, the authorities will demand entry,
seize counterfeit goods, related paraphernalia, equipment, and in some in-
stances, automobiles, trucks, and motorcycles found on the premises. Raids
are often dramatic, cause confusion and panic among counterfeiters on the
premises, and occasionally involve violence.
2. Sanctions and Penalties
While many brand owners are impressed by the ease and speed with
which they can obtain raid actions, most are dissatisfied with the resulting
sanctions and penalties imposed upon those determined by authorities to
have violated relevant laws. After the raids, the authorities will review all
available evidence and decide whether the brand owner's rights have been
violated.4' Under the Trademark Law Implementing Rules, AICs have
authority to impose maximum fines of up to 50% of the counterfeiter's ille-
accompanying risks to security and personal safety, require extensive outside help even
when these cases are managed by in-house legal counsel.38The right of a trademark owner to file a complaint with the AICs is set forth in article
42 of the PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules. See PRC Trademark Law Implement-
ing Rules, art. 42.39The description in this paragraph is based upon the author's own experiences as in-
house legal counsel for a multinational enterprise in China from 1997-99.401n many instances, the brand owner and the authorities have already gotten to know
each other during a pre-raid dinner and karaoke party held the night before. Entertaining en-
forcement officials has become a regular (and some say expected) practice among brand
owners. See David H. Freedman, Chinese Copycats Are Leaving International Brands Fit to
be Tied, FoRBES MAG., Apr. 5, 1999, at 51.
41 Where the TSB is involved, it will decide whether the counterfeit goods are of an infe-
rior quality or violate the rights of consumers. See PRC Product Quality Law, art. 12; PRC
Consumers Law, art. 34.
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gal turnover and up to 5 times the profit earned by the counterfeiter.42 AICs
also have authority to order compensation measured either by the counter-
feiter's profits or by the damages suffered by the brand owner.43 A review
of recent statistics indicates, however, that implementation of these provi-
sions has resulted in fines and compensation awards that fail to deter coun-
terfeiters.
Of the 14,736 cases enforced by the AIC at all levels nationwide in
1998, the total compensation awarded by AICs to brand owners was about
$600,000, or about $41 dollars per case. 44 Total fines assessed against
counterfeiters were about $10.4 million, or about $699 per case.45 At these
levels, most counterfeiters simply view these penalties as a minor annoy-
ance and the cost of doing business in a lucrative trade.46
What about products, equipment and other materials seized? The con-
fiscation of materials can constitute substantial losses to the counterfeiter,
but most authorities will sell these materials at an auction where the coun-
terfeiter, his associates, or others seeking to enter the illegal trade may be
the purchaser.47 Where possible, authorities will erase the offending trade-
mark from the counterfeit products before selling the products at a public
auction.4 Where equipment has been seized and can be used for lawful
purposes, authorities will also sell equipment at a public auction.49 Only in
those relatively unusual instances where the trademark cannot be eliminated
without destroying the products and where the equipment cannot be used
for lawful purposes will authorities destroy all materials seized,50 usually at
the expense of the brand owner.5 ' Some brand owners will feel compelled
42See PRC Trademark Lav Implementing Rules, art. 43.43See PRC Trademark Law, art. 39.
44 See STATE ADMINIsTRATION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 1998 ANNUAL REPORT at 15
(PRC) [hereinafter "SAIc 1998 ANNUAL REPORT"].
45See id. Similar statistics exist for the previous year. In 1997, AICs at all levels nation-
wide brought 15,321 counterfeiting and trademark infringement actions. See STATE
ADMINISTRATION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 1997 ANNUAL REPORT at 11 (PRC) [herein-
after "SAIc 1997 ANNUAL REPORT"]. Total fines assessed were $10.4 million or $679 per
case. See id. Total compensation paid to brand owners was approximately $614,000 or $40
per case. See id.
16For the size of the trade in counterfeit goods, see Murphy, supra note 3.47In many cases, the auction price for used equipment and counterfeit goods is less than
the replacement costs for these materials.48See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 43 (iii).
49See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 43(iv). This provision only estab-
lishes the power of authorities to confiscate equipment and is not sufficiently detailed to de-
scribe the practice of how authorities sell confiscated equipment through auction-this
observation is based upon the author's own experience.
50See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 43(v).
s, Many authorities ask the brand owner to pay for the costs of renting a space and for the
materials needed to destroy counterfeit goods. The reasons given are usually that the author-
ity lacks the resources to pay these costs.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:447 (2000)
to purchase seized materials at public auctions in order to prevent these
materials from returning to the counterfeiter in question or coming into the
possession of other questionable parties that may seek to enter this illegal
trade.
52
3. Reasons for Inadequate Fines and Compensation Awards
A number of factors help explain why fines and compensation awards
are relatively low. Current law does not require mandatory minimum fines
against counterfeiters-as a result, all decisions on the amount of fines is
within the discretion of the relevant administrative authority. Most admin-
istrative authorities awardin 3compensation do so on the basis of the profits
earned by the counterfeiter. In most instances, this calculation is deter-
mined by the AICs on the basis of the counterfeiter's total revenues minus a
deduction for the counterfeiter's production and sales costs.5 4 In general,
because counterfeiter lack written or documentary records, these determi-
nations are made by administrative authorities on the basis of the counter-
feiter's own oral representations of its profits and costs.
55
Most observers of the current enforcement system believe that awards
of compensation based upon actual damages to the brand owner would be
more effective in both compensating the brand owner and in serving as a
deterrent. Administrative authorities, however, seldom use the alternative
standard based upon damages to the brand owner. 6 Most administrative
enforcement officials are not lawyers and have not received training in law,
economics, or statistics. As a result, most are not comfortable with making
complicated damage calculations that involve extrapolations from existing
information concerning revenues, profits, and other data. Rather, most ad-
ministrative authorities find that using the compensation standard, based
upon the counterfeiter's profits, to be a simpler method to apply.
4. Analysis and Comparison
In other jurisdictions such as the United States, a plaintiff in a civil ac-
tion against a counterfeiter is entitled to recover "(1) defendant's profits, (2)
any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.,5 7 In
assessing profits, the plaintiff is simply required to prove the defendant's
sales. The burden of proof shifts then to the defendant to demonstrate all
52This observation is based upon the author's own experience with the AICs in China.
53This observation is based upon the author's own experience in enforcing trademark
rights in China.
54See supra note 52.
55See id.56See id.
5715 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (West 1999).
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elements of costs or deductions claimed. 8 Failure to satisfy this burden
will result in no costs deducted from the defendant's total sales. The total
amount of sales attributable to the counterfeit is calculated based upon the
price of the genuine product and not that of the counterfeit product. Courts
in the United States have discretion to adjust the sum of damages higher or
lower depending upon the circumstances.5 9 In cases where the act of coun-
terfeiting is intentional, courts are required, in the absence of attenuating
circumstances, to enter judgment for three times such profits or damages,
whichever is higher, along with an award to the plaintiff of reasonable at-
torney's fees.60
Unlike the United States, China does not have provisions for statutory
damages. The advantage of statutory damages is that it obviates the need to
calculate damages in each case. The availability of such an option under
Chinese law, if set at certain levels, may help to address the problem of
awards that do not adequately compensate the brand owner for damages
suffered. Under United States law, in a civil action involving a counterfeit
trademark, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before a final judgment is
entered by the court, to recover statutory damages instead of actual damages
and profits.6 ' Statutory damages range from between $500 to $100,000




China determines criminal liability for counterfeiting based upon a
bright-line standard measured by the amount of sales of counterfeit prod-
ucts, currently set at a minimum of about $6,000.6 All criminal actions
5 See id.
59See id.60 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (West 1999).
6 1See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (West 1999).
62See id.
63 Article 140 of the Criminal Code provides:
A producer or distributor who mixes up or adulterates products with fake and shoddy materials,
passes fake imitations for genuine ones, sells second-class goods at first-class goods' prices, or
passes unqualified products as qualified ones, when the sale amount is not less than RMB 50,000
yuan nor more than RMB 200,000 yuan, shall be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not
more than two years or criminal detention, and may in addition or exclusively be subject to a fine of
not less than 50% of nor more than two times of the sale amount. If the sale amount is not less than
RMB 200,000 yuan nor more than RMB 500,000 yuan, the sentence shall be a fixed-term imprison-
ment of not less than two years nor more than seven years and may also include a fine of not less
than 50% of nor more than two times of the sale amount If the sale amount is not less than RMB
500,000 yuan nor more than RMB 2,000,000 yuan, the sentence shall be a fixed-term imprisonment
of not less than seven years, and may also include a fine of not less than 50% of nor more than two
times of the sale amount. If the sale amount is more than RMB 2,000,000 yuan, the sentence shall
be a fixed-term imprisonment of fifteen years or life imprisonment, and may also include a fine not
less than 50% of nor more than two times of the sale amount or confiscation of property.
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must be initiated by the Public Security Bureau ("PSB"), China's principal
police organization.64 This usually happens according to the following pat-
terns: First, some cases initially brought by administrative authorities are
transferred to the PSBs because the amounts in question indicate criminal
liability or other serious circumstances are involved, such as death or seri-
ous injury to consumers. 65  Second, third parties can approach the PSBs
with a complaint or other information leading to a suspected counterfeiter.
Third, the PSBs have the power to initiate criminal actions on their own
initiative, based upon their own investigations.66
Once the PSBs begin an investigation, they then decide whether suffi-
cient cause for criminal liability exists. If so, the PSBs will then transfer
the case to the Procuratorate, China's principal prosecutorial organ.67 The
Procuratorate will then decide whether to file a criminal action in court and
proceed to trial. 68 Once the PSBs decide to transfer the case to the Procu-
ratorate, it is likely that the Procuratorate will file a criminal complaint and
eventually obtain a criminal conviction against the counterfeiter. As a
1997 Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the Second Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and revised at the Fifth Session of the
Eighth National People's Congress on March 14, 1997), in WEI Luo, THE 1997 CRIMINAL
CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND
INTRODUCTION 85 (1998) [hereinafter "PRC Criminal Code"]. Other provisions also provide
for criminal liability, including art. 213, which states:
Anyone who uses a trademark identical to a registered trademark on the same type of goods without
the permission of the owner of the registered trademark and the circumstances are serious, shall be
sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention, and may
in addition or exclusively be sentenced to a fine. If the circumstances are exceptionally serious, the
sentence shall be a fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years nor more than seven years,
and a fine.
PRC Criminal Code, art. 213. The terms, referring to serious and exceptionally serious con-
sequences, are not further defined in the statute. Authorities have interpreted the 1993
guidelines issued by the Supreme People's Procuratorate to indicate that profits of RMB
20,000 or total turnover of RMB 100,000 constitute serious circumstances. Discussions
between the author and the Supreme People's Court and the Ministry of Public Security in-
dicate that these guidelines are no longer in effect after the enactment of the new Criminal
Code in 1997 and there are currently no guidelines for interpreting these terms.
64See PEOPLE'S POLICE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zhonghua Renmin
Gonghe Guo Gongan Fa) (adopted at the 12ti meeting of the Standing Committee of the
Eighth National People's Congress on Feb. 28, 1995, promulgated by Order No. 40 of the
President of the People's Republic of China on Feb. 28, 1995 and effective as of the same
date) art. 1& 2 (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Police Law"].
65See, e.g., PRC Trademark Law, art. 40.
66See PRC Police Law, art. 6(1).
6 7 See PUBLIC PROCURATORS LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zhonghu Renmin
Gonghe Guo Jiancha Guan Fa) (adopted at the 120' meeting of the Standing Committee of
the Eighth National People's Congress on Feb. 28, 1995, promulgated by Order No. 39 of
the President of the People's Republic of China on Feb. 28, 1995 and effective as of July 1,
1995) art. I & 2 (PRC) [hereinafter "PRC Procurators Law"].68See PRC Procurators Law, art. 6.
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practical matter, PSBs accept cases for investigation only when sums in-
volved are high, when serious issues of corruption are involved, or when
death or serious injury to consumers has occurred.69
1. Proof and Evidence
To establish proof of sales of counterfeiting goods above the $6,000
threshold, the current practice of administrative authorities, police, prose-
cutors, and courts is to require direct physical evidence in the form of re-
ceipts, accounts, ledger books, or tax documents.70 Most PSBs will require
such evidence before proceeding any further with a criminal investigation.71
This creates a significant hurdle because most counterfeiters do not keep
physical records of their activities, and any records recovered are written to
disguise counterfeiting activity. 72
What about any counterfeit goods, packaging, and equipment seized on
the premises? In China today, such materials are not considered evidence
of sales within the meaning of the Criminal Code.73 PRC authorities read
the requirements of the law to require evidence of completed sales-cur-
rently this can be satisfied only by physical evidence of a completed sale in
the form of a receipt or similar document or by the counterfeiter's oral con-
fession.74 Materials seized on the counterfeiter's premises, no matter how
large the amount, are not considered proof or sales and are not considered to
be a basis from which proof of sales can be inferred.
These evidentiary standards are one reason that criminal prosecutions
are rare. In 1998, of 14,736 trademark infringement and counterfeiting
cases brought by AICs of all levels nationwide, only 35 cases, or 1 in every
421 cases, were transferred by administrative authorities to police and
prosecutors for criminal prosecution.75 No information is available on how
many of these cases actually resulted in criminal convictions.
69The PSBs have limited personnel and resources and tend to use such resources for
crimes involving violence and harm to persons. Intellectual property crimes are viewed as
having lower priority.70This observation is based upon the author's own experience in pursuing criminal con-
victions for counterfeiting cases in the PRC and confirmed by discussions with judges,
prosecutors, and lawyers in the PRC during the author's visit with a group of US experts on
counterfeiting in Nov. 1999. See also The Tools You Can Use, Bus. CHINA, Jan. 3, 2000, at
5, available in WL 2164483, at 3 (noting that threshold for criminal liability is based on
proof of prior sales).
7 1See id.
72This observation is based upon the author's own experience in China.
73See The Tools You Can Use, supra note 70, at 3.
74See id.75See SAIc 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 15. In 1997, of the 15,321 trade-
mark infringement and counterfeiting cases brought by all levels nationwide by the AIC,
only 57 cases, or 1 in 269 cases, were transferred to judicial authorities for criminal prosecu-
tion. See SAIC 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 11.
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2. Analysis and Comparison
While China is somewhat unusual in using a bright-line standard for
criminal liability, this approach is workable so long as the standards for
proof and evidence are realistic and attainable. The requirement of direct
physical evidence, however, is difficult to satisfy in most cases.
(a) Criminal Liability
In the United States, courts often rely on indirect evidence of counter-
feiting, both to establish criminal liability and damages.76 Thus, eyewitness
testimony by accomplices, associates, or undercover agents concerning
counterfeiting activity can be used to establish criminal liability. Any
counterfeit goods found on the premises will also support an inference of
liability. Courts are also able to extrapolate and draw inferences from the
presence or absence of evidence. For example, courts may extrapolate the
amount of counterfeit sales based upon the amount of goods seized upon
the premises. Where the defendant is missing business records, the court
may, in some circumstances, make an inference of illegal activity based on
the absence of such records because lawful businesses usually keep finan-
cial and business records.
(b) Criminal Attempt
In the United States, evidence that may not be sufficient to establish li-
ability for a substantive criminal offense may be sufficient to establish li-
ability for a criminal attempt.77 For example, take a case where authorities
seize counterfeit goods and equipment used to produce counterfeits on the
premises of an alleged counterfeiter. In the United States, courts may use
this evidence to establish criminal attempt to violate laws against the pro-
duction and sale of counterfeit goods, even if such evidence is not sufficient
to establish violations of the substantive laws against counterfeiting.
Such an approach may help to address China's issues of requiring di-
rect physical evidence of sales. Evidence that may not be acceptable as
proof of sales, such as goods and equipment found on the premises, may be
sufficient to establish criminal attempt to violate laws against counterfeit-
ing. While this approach would be consistent with China's current laws
76See Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolttion
of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 893-896 (1999). See also United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133-
134 (5k" Cir. 1991) (circumstantial evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction for con-
spiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods).
77See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (West 1999) ("Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts
to traffic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection
with such goods or services shall ... be fined not more than $2,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or'both .... ).
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against criminal attempt,78 few enforcement authorities in China appear to
have considered this approach for several reasons. In general, brand owners
have not attempted to bring claims based upon criminal attempt but have
focused most of their efforts on establishing the substantive offenses against
counterfeiting. As brand owners continue to pursue various innovative and
creative options in their battle against counterfeiters, they may begin to
press claims based upon criminal attempt. Such new efforts should draw
official attention to these claims and require authorities to decide whether
claims against counterfeiters based upon criminal attempt are viable under
the PRC criminal system. In addition, the initial determination on whether
to pursue a criminal investigation is made by officials of the PSB, a police
organization, who generally do not have legal training and may not have
sufficient professional knowledge or background in law to pursue cases
based upon complex legal concepts such as attempt. More experience and
training in this area for the PSB (and prosecutors) may help to make recog-
nition of criminal attempt to engage in counterfeiting a cognizable offense
under PRC criminal law.
(c) Landlord-Tenant Culpability Issues
Liability for counterfeiting in China currently focuses on manufactur-
ers and vendors of counterfeit products and does not generally extend to
other significant actors in the counterfeit trade. Brand owners tend to focus
on manufacturers based on the view that this attacks the source of the
problem.79 Some brand owners also target large vendors, but liability for a
sale can be difficult to establish because of the requirement that the sale was
made with knowledge that the goods were counterfeit.80 Brand owners and
authorities have not focused on large-scale distributors or wholesale mar-
kets, which play a crucial role in the trade in counterfeit goods.
In large wholesale markets in China, there are typically hundreds even
thousands of individual vendors renting booths, stalls, or small stores from
a landlord that typically has invested in and helped to establish the whole-
sale market.8 These large wholesale and distribution centers are organized,
78Article 23 of the PRC Criminal Code provides:
A criminal attempt refers to a case where an offender has already begun to commit a crime but is
prevented from completing it for reasons independent of his will. An offender who attempts to
commit a crime may, in comparison with one who completed the crime, be given a lighter or miti-
gated punishment.
PRC Criminal Code, art. 23.
79 Among other provisions, liability for producing counterfeiting goods can be established
under article 38 of the PRC Trademark Law and article 140 of the PRC Criminal Code. See
PRC Trademark Law, art.38; PRC Criminal Code, art 140.
8°See PRC Trademark Law, art. 38(2).
81 Wholesale markets all throughout China serve the key role of providing distribution
channels for goods that cannot enter the market through normal distribution channels. With-
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well financed, and may be the most significant organized crime entities in
the counterfeit trade in China. In some of these markets, a large majority of
these vendors are selling counterfeit goods, up to 80 or 90% in some
cases.8 2 Some of these landlords have placed signs in the markets warning
against the sales of counterfeit goods, and have inserted covenants against
the commission of illegal activities in the leases signed with individual ven-
dors.83 These actions are designed to protect these landlords against liabil-
ity for the actions of their tenants, as opposed to discouraging such illegal
activities. In some cases, these landlords may be a local government entity,
such as the local AIC, charged with the regulation of markets but also with
enforcement against counterfeiting.8 4
Although there can be little doubt that these landlords are encouraging,
protecting, or at least tolerating these illegal activities on the rented prem-
ises,85 Chinese law does not currently appear to recognize liability of the
landlord for the activities of these tenants. However, brand owners do have
arguments for landlord liability based on an interpretation of existing
laws.86 For example, while landlords do not produce or sell counterfeit
goods in violation of applicable laws, it can be argued that landlords "deal
in' '87 counterfeit goods or "facilitate" counterfeiting by providing "storage,
out these wholesale markets, counterfeit goods could not reach retail outlets and the con-
sumer. Many smaller wholesalers or retailers will pour over wholesale markets on a
monthly or weekly basis and purchase counterfeit goods for resale to other retail outlets or to
consumers. Many wholesale markets are located in densely populated areas and convenient
to traffic. For a more detailed discussion of these wholesale markets and their vital role in
the trade in counterfeit goods, see Chow, supra note 1, at 14-17; see also Stuck in the Mid-
dle, supra note 2, at 3-4.
82 See Chow, supra note 1, at 17.
83This observation is based upon the author's own experience in investigating wholesale
markets in China-the author was able to review several leases entered into between tenants
and landlords and make numerous visits to wholesale markets.
8Prior to China's economic reforms, the AICs typically established and managed whole-
sale markets. For further discussion, see Chow, supra note 1, at 22-23.85Based upon the author's own experience, the involvement of landlords in the counter-
feit trade appears to be well known to most consumers.
6Landlords are arguably in violation of the catch-all provision Article 38(4) of the PRC
Trademark Law because they "cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right" of
the trademark owner. PRC Trademark Law, art. 38(4). This provision is further amplified
by Article 41 of the PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules. PRC Trademark Law Im-
plementing Rules, art. 41.87Article 41(2) imposes liability where an entity "deals in goods that one knows or
should know to be goods that infringe another's exclusive right to use a registered trade-
mark." See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 41(2). Knowledge can be in-
ferred from the low prices charged for the goods, sometimes one half to one third of the price
of the genuine product. In other cases, knowledge can also be inferred where the market has
been frequently raided and where counterfeit goods make up a large percentage (up to 90%
in some wholesale markets) of all goods sold.
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transportation, mailing or concealment '" '88 in violation of Article 41 of the
PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules.8 9 To date, however, no brand
owner has attempted to bring an action directly against landlords in whole-
sale markets or against the corporate entity that organized the market using
the PRC Trademark Law, PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules or any
other laws. Most brand owners limit their actions to raids against individual
wholesale vendors within the market, which can have several hundred to
several thousand such vendors. In the United States, under some circum-
stances, a landlord may be held liable for the activities of its tenants.90
(d) Lesser Criminal Offenses
The laws related to counterfeiting in China do not appear to draw dis-
tinctions between various degrees of criminal liability and levels of criminal
culpability. While it is true that the penalties for criminal violations be-
come more severe as the amount of sales of counterfeit goods increases, no
distinction is drawn concerning the type of crimes involved. Moreover, any
conviction under the current PRC Criminal Code results in a minimum term
of imprisonment of at least two or three years, depending upon the relevant
criminal provision.91 The severity of the punishments involved may be one
reason for the high threshold for a criminal conviction and for the difficulty
experienced by trademark owners in achieving such convictions.
United States law draws distinctions between various degrees of crimi-
nal culpability, treating certain types of criminal offenses as more serious
than others. Depending upon the circumstances, a certain type of criminal
conduct can be classified as a felony, a serious criminal offense, or as a
misdemeanor, a less serious criminal offense. Drawing a distinction be-
tween various levels of criminal culpability may permit enforcement
authorities in China to have more flexibility in imposing criminal liability
on counterfeiters. For example, a counterfeiting offense that is classified as
a minor crime may involve only a short term of imprisonment, such as 3 to
88See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 41(3) (imposing liability for "in-
tentionally provid[ing] conditions facilitating the infringement of another's exclusive right to
use a trademark such as storage, transportation, mailing or concealment."). The intent ele-
ment of Article 41(3) seems to impose a scienter requirement beyond knowledge as set forth
in Article 41(1), but to date there are no legislative history materials or any other materials
that provide further illumination of these terms. A landlord's tender of premises used for
selling counterfeits appears also to differ from storage facilities or facilities that conceal the
activity.
89See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 41.
9°See, e.g., B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards
Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 679,
743-756 (1992) (discussing federal drug laws that allow forfeiture of a landowner's property
because of the illegal behavior of his or her tenants).
91 See, e.g., PRC Criminal Code, art. 140 (two years); PRC Criminal Code, art. 213 (three
years).
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6 months, a punishment that should still have deterrent effect given the
stigma and social consequences of imprisonment in China.
(e) Aggregating Criminal Offenses
It is unclear whether Chinese law permits the aggregation of several
separate offenses for the purpose of satisfying the legal requirements for a
criminal conviction. For example, if a counterfeiter were caught in three
separate incidents with sales in each discrete incident failing to exceeding
the $6,000 requirement but with aggregated sales from all three incidents
exceeding the $6,000 figure, would this result in criminal liability? The
PRC Ministry of Public Security has acknowledged that such an approach is
possible but to date no definitive guidelines or official position has been
promulgated supporting the aggregation approach. In the United States,
discrete incidents can be aggregated for the purpose of determining knowl-
edge, intent, and seriousness of the offense to find criminal liability.
9 2
C. CIVIL ACTIONS
Civil litigation has not emerged to date as a practical or viable option
for brand owners in most cases. This difficulty can be traced to problems of
evidence collection and the general inability to obtain immediate relief from
courts in the form of temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunc-
tions. The filing of a civil action against a counterfeiter may not be useful
if the plaintiff cannot also obtain an immediate court order restraining the
defendant from destroying or disposing of evidence, such as an existing
stock of counterfeit goods, equipment, or records, if any.
Obtaining evidence in the absence of temporary restraining orders and
seizure actions also makes civil litigation an unattractive option. Most
brand owners find that the best method for obtaining action is through a raid
and seizure action, but such procedures are normally not available through
92See, e.g., United States v. Riles, 928 F.2d 339 (10h Cir. 1991) (drug offenses that are
part of the same course of conduct can be aggregated for purposes of determining the seri-
ousness of the base offense level under federal law); United States v. Abod, 770 F.2d 1293,
1297 (5h' Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress permitted aggregating of separate incidents in or-
der to meet minimum threshold amount of $1000 for credit car fraud). Under United States
law, an offense can be viewed as part of a pattern of continuing criminal activity, thus mer-
iting a more severe punishment. Under recent amendments to the Federal Racketeer Influ-
enced Corrupt Practices ("RICO"), trading in counterfeit goods is considered to be a
predicate offense in a pattern of continuing criminal activity, thus constituting a RICO viola-
tion and allowing the imposition of a maximum RICO penalty of 25 years imprisonment and
a fine of twice the proceeds of the illegal activity. See David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren,
The Criminalization of Trademark Counterfeiting, 31 CoNN. L. REv. 1, 72 (1998). Addi-
tionally, the seriousness of an offense or any prior convictions for violating intellectual prop-
erty rights will also affect the application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines and result in a
stiffer sentence. See Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
235 (1999).
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civil courts. Rather, the raid and seizure action must normally be pursued
through administrative authorities such as the AICs. Once the AIC has
seized evidence, brand owners have generally found it difficult to get such
evidence transferred to courts for civil litigation. There are currently no
guidelines on the transfer of such evidence and in the absence of such
guidelines, evidence may become destroyed or lost after seizure by the
AICs. In addition, many AICs will seek to auction off seized equipment
and products (after removing the offending counterfeit mark)93 and are un-
likely to transfer such evidence to courts and forego the revenues that would
otherwise be obtained through public auctions. While some trademark
owners have attempted to pursue litigation after raids made by AICs, most
have found that such obstacles make it difficult to get evidence transferred
from administrative authorities to courts. Moreover, some courts will not
accept jurisdiction while the case is still pending before an administrative
authority.94 As a result, plaintiffs must wait until the AIC issues a final de-
cision in the matter, which usually takes up to three months. 95 By the time
the decision is issued, the evidence and the suspect may have long disap-
peared from the scene.
Compensation awards to successful plaintiffs have been generally low
by western standards because courts apply the same laws and methods for
determining damages as those applied by administrative authorities, and
statutory damages are unavailable.96 Some plaintiffs have achieved some
good results through the recently established Intellectual Property Divisions• . , .. . . . 97 h
of the intermediate People's Courts in some jurisdictions. However, the
civil litigation system in the PRC continues to lag behind the administrative
enforcement system in terms of resources, expertise, and power.
1. Analysis and Comparison
Civil litigation continues to be an unattractive option because of the
lack of immediate injunctive relief and the lack of a mechanism providing
plaintiffs xvith the opportunity to gather evidence during a raid for civil liti-
gation.
In the United States, a plaintiff may appear ex parte before a federal
court and apply for both a seizure order for counterfeit goods and a tempo-
rary restraining order ("TRO") against a suspected counterfeiter.9" If the
93 See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
94Applicable law provides for a civil litigation option after administrative remedies have
been exhausted. See PRC Trademark Law Implementing Rules, art. 43.
95 See The Tools You Can Use, supra note 70, at 1.96See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
9 7
See PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 24 (1997).
98 Such relief requires the posting of security by the plaintiff in the form of a bond. If the
plaintiff ultimately prevails in the case, then the security is released to the plaintiff. If the
defendant prevails, the security is used to indemnify the defendant against any damages suf-
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court decides to grant the plaintiffs application, the plaintiff is then entitled
to go to the premises accompanied by a federal marshal and seize the goods.
At the time of the raid, the plaintiff also serves a copy of the TRO and the
complaint upon the defendant. The terms of the TRO often prohibit the de-
fendant from engaging in any further infringing activity and also prohibit
the defendant from disposing of any evidence upon pain of contempt sanc-
tions (including imprisonment) for the violation of the court order. Under
federal practice, the TRO is effective for ten days within which time a
hearing must be held in order to determine whether the court should issue a
preliminary injunction, i.e., an order that continues the prohibitions con-
tained in the TRO until the final resolution of the case before the court.99
Once the preliminary injunction is issued, the case can then proceed to trial
where the court can determine what remedies should be granted to a pre-
vailing plaintiff. The plaintiff can also apply for a hearing on the prelimi-
nary injunction before the expiration of the ten-day period. In most
instances, the parties agree to settle the case without a trial and the court
enters a consent decree. In some instances, the final resolution of the case
may involve a permanent injunction, a court order that permanently bars the
defendant from engaging in certain activities, the violation of which may
result in criminal liability and imprisonment.
These provisional remedies discussed above allow a brand owner to
immediately stop a counterfeiter from engaging in additional harmful con-
duct at the same time (or before) a complaint is filed in civil court. This
type of provisional relief does not appear to be a viable option under
China's current judicial system and without this type of mechanism,'0° few
fered through the actions of the plaintiff. For a discussion of the federal injunction process,
see generally FED. R. Civ. P. 65. For a discussion of injunctions in connection with intel-
lectual property cases, see Jason R. Berne, Court Intervention but Not in a Classic Form: A
Survey of Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1157, 1162-1163,
1208-1209 (1999).
99 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
1°°According to Judge Dong Tianping, Division Head, Intellectual Property Rights Tri-
bunal, Supreme People's Court, the equivalent of the TRO and preliminary injunctive relief
is available through a combination of Articles 92, 93 & 97 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law.
Interview with Judge Dong Tian Ping, Division Head, Intellectual Property Rights Tribunal,
Supreme People's Court (May 16, 2000). Article 97 provides for "advance execution," al-
lowing a court at any time upon the application of the plaintiff-even before the complaint is
filed-to issue an order prohibiting the defendant from taking certain actions, including con-
tinuation of counterfeiting or infringing activity where "urgent circumstances require ad-
vance execution." See PRC CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW. (adopted at the 4t, Session of the 7th
National People's Congress on April 9, 1991, promulgated by Order No. 44 of the President
of the People's Republic of China on April 9, 1991 and effective as of the same date) art. 97
(PRC) [hereinafter "Civil Procedure Law"]. Articles 92 & 93 provide for the preservation of
property (or evidence) through an application by an interested party (which application can
be made before the filing of a complaint) and upon the posting of security. Within 48 hours,
the court must decide whether to issue an order and if such an order is issued court officials
will proceed to the site and seal the area, preventing evidence from being lost, hidden, or de-
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plaintiffs in China will find civil litigation a viable option against counter-
feiters.
I. LONG TERM ISSUES IN ENFORCEMENT AGAINST
COUNTERFEITING IN CHINA
This part examines certain long-term systemic issues relating to en-
forcement against counterfeiting. These issues relate to structural features
of the current enforcement system and to long-term issues of training, per-
sonnel, and resources.
A. COORDINATION AMONG VARIOUS ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES
China's regulatory structure, which divides the economy into vertical
sectors, has resulted in a number of parallel enforcement mechanisms. In
some instances, this system has led to bureaucratic and professional rival-
ries among the various enforcement agencies, resulting in behaviors that
may frustrate effective enforcement. For example, in a case where an AIC
has conducted a raid and has seized evidence indicating criminal liability,
the transfer by the AIC of the case to police and prosecutors will require
that the AIC also transfer all materials seized at the site.10' This means that
the AICs will need to forgo all fines and penalties, will be unable to auction
off any seized goods, and will have less to state on their annual reports of
activities on which their performance and professional advancement is
judged.
10 2
The establishment of guidelines concerning the work of the various en-
forcement entities, procedures for cooperation and coordination, and rules
for the transfer of cases may help to alleviate some of these problems.1°'
B. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
As set forth earlier, China's current enforcement system places heavy
emphasis on public enforcement against counterfeiting, mostly through ad-
ministrative authorities such as the AICs or TSBs.10 4 Up to 85% of all
stroyed. Civil Procedure Law, arts. 92 & 93. The applicant then has 15 days to bring an ac-
tion in court; if no suit is filed within this 15 day period, the court will cancel the property
preservation. Civil Procedure Law, art. 93. According to Judge Dong violations of any of
the orders discussed above can result in imprisonment for the offender. The author's own
experience in China indicates that few brand owners are aware of these procedures and that
it is unclear whether courts will in practice enforce these procedures as described above.
10 1 See The Tools You Can Use, supra note 70, at 4.
1
0 2 See id.
103 Another possibility is to centralize all enforcement powers in a single administrative
entity, but this may not be a practical alternative in China's current political climate. Any
shifts in power and resources from current entrenched distributions may give rise to political
resistance by those entities currently enjoying such power and its accompanying prestige.
1°4See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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counterfeit enforcement actions are brought by administrative authorities.'
05
This feature can be attributed to China's historic centrally planned eco-
nomic system in which most aspects of the economy were planned, con-
trolled, and administered by the State. This system may have worked well
when fewer private rights, interests, and free market transactions were at
stake under China's pre-reform economy. Under present conditions, how-
ever, emphasis on public enforcement presents some disadvantages for
brand owners.
For example, the AIC is primarily a regulatory and enforcement body,
charged with the general administration of economic enterprises and the
general development of commerce. 10 6 As a result, the AIC is not focused
upon vindicating private rights. In the enforcement area, the AIC tends to
focus on imposing fines and penalties on the counterfeiter and is not fo-
cused primarily on protecting the rights and interests of the trademark
owner. Similarly, the TSB is charged with protecting the rights of the con-
sumer and also is not primarily concerned with protecting the rights of the
trademark owner.10 7 As a result, neither body is focused on making the
trademark owner whole by awarding compensatory damages commensurate
with the actual losses suffered. Awards of compensation, when made, tend
to be minor in comparison to actual losses suffered.'0 8
By contrast to Western nations, the PRC has not to date created strong
tools for private enforcement where the focus is on both compensatory
damages to the trademark owner and the development of remedies specifi-
cally geared towards the protection of the private plaintiffs rights. For ex-
ample, remedies such as attachment and forced sale of the defendant's
property, freezing bank accounts, and permanent injunctive relief (backed
by civil and criminal sanctions) have not been developed in the PRC. In
countries like the United States, private enforcement through civil litigation,
or the threat thereof, assumes a major role in the protection of intellectual
property rights. 10 9
05This figure is based on the author's discussions with PRC administrative enforcement
officials, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers during the author's trip to the PRC as part of a
delegation of US experts on intellectual property law. See supra note*.
16 See, e.g., PRC Trademark Law, arts. I & 2.
107See supra text accompanying note 33.
'
08 See supra text accompanying note 44; see also SAIC 1997 Annual Report, supra note
45.
'09For recent examples of the successful use of civil litigation by plaintiffs to protect
their trademark rights, see A.C. Legg Packing Co., Inc. v. Olde Plantation Spice Co.,61 F.
Supp. 2d 426 (D. Md. 1999); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999); World
Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World,, 47 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999); Am. Employers'
Ins. Co. v. DeLorme Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.Me. 1999); Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of
N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). For a review of trademark infringement
litigation basics, see Marcy J. Bergman, Trademark Infringement Litigation Primer, 569
PLiIPAT443 (1999).
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C. RELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Recently in response to pressures for more effective action, a number
of local governments at the provincial level (one level below the national or
central level in Beijing) have enacted local legislation on counterfeiting.110
For example, Guangdong Province, a hotbed of counterfeiting in southeast-
em China, has recently enacted local legislation that applies stiff fines and
penalties for counterfeiting."' While local authorities in Guangdong appear
to be vigorous in enforcing these new laws and in collecting fines and pen-
alties, it is still too early to determine whether enforcement of these new
laws will actually result in deterrence.
Local legislation in China is lawful so long as the local legislation is
not inconsistent with national legislation. The current practice in China
does not appear to be concerned with uniformity of local laws, coordination
between various provinces and local governments, and coordination be-
tween national governments and local governments. Issues of coordination
among various jurisdictions and uniformity of local laws may become an
issue as more local jurisdictions enact their own legislation.112
D. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
Currently, Chinese authorities do not use as wide an array of investi-
gative techniques as investigative entities in the United States, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. They may purchase counterfeit goods in
order to collect evidence, but Chinese authorities generally do not engage in
other types of investigations. Chinese authorities often rely upon the brand
owners to engage a growing private investigation industry for the gathering
of evidence against counterfeiters, but such private agencies are limited by
law to certain methods and cannot use the array of techniques that would be
available to a law enforcement entity.
In the United States, private investigators also serve an important role
in assisting government enforcement entities, but government investigators
do engage in a wide variety of investigative methods of their own.113 Many
government entities use hidden cameras and audio equipment to document
"0For a description of the legislation passed by Guangdong Province, see The Tools You
Can Use, supra note 70, at 5.
" See id.
112Unlike China, the United States has a dual system of government at the national and
state and local levels. While China and the United States have different systems of govern-
ment, a study of consideration of federal-state relations on legislative matters and on how
uniformity in state law is maintained may be useful.
1
3 The observations in this paragraph are based on a number of conversations between
the author and Mr. Timothy B. Klund, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Charlotte, North Carolina, while we were both in China during an exchange initiative be-
tween the United States and China on enforcement of intellectual property rights. For a fur-
ther description of this exchange, see supra note *.
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transactions and conversations that are later used as evidence. Government
investigators also may assume false identities in an undercover capacity for
the purpose of infiltrating counterfeiting rings in order to trace counterfeit-
ing from the retail level back to the source in manufacturing or distribution.
Some of these investigations may take months and result in a sting opera-
tion against multiple counterfeiters. In cases involving organized crime,
government agents may also use wiretaps.
E. TRAINING OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS
Many of the judges and prosecutors in China are not lawyers and have
received no formal legal training. 14 This may be true even for the judges
who sit on China's recently established specialized intellectual property
courts. While this practice is changing and the younger generation of
judges and lawyers are either law school graduates or have legal training,
there is still a significant number of existing judges and prosecutors who do
not have a legal background. Additional training of these judges and prose-
cutors in the areas of trademarks and intellectual property would be useful
for the long term.
F. NON-LAWYERS AND LEGAL WORK
A serious issue exists where persons without legal training engage in
legal work."" For example, the PSBs are charged to make a preliminary as-
sessment of criminal liability under present law and practice. Unless the
PSBs decide that there is sufficient evidence of criminal liability, they will
not pursue an investigation and refer the matter to the Procuratorate. The
determination by the PSBs is essentially one of legal interpretation and ap-
plication of laws-i.e., interpreting the provisions of the Criminal Code re-
lating to criminal liability for counterfeiting and reviewing evidence for
sufficiency. One reason why PSBs require direct physical evidence of sales
in the form of receipts is because PSBs have little or no experience with
evaluating indirect evidence, drawing inferences from circumstantial evi-
dence, or making extrapolations based upon existing evidence.
Similarly, the AICs have authority to award compensation based upon
damages suffered by the plaintiff, but tend to use the more simple method
"4Recent legislative changes now require "professional legal knowledge" as a qualifica-
tion for judges and prosecutors and training in law for those appointed prior to the enactment
of these new laws. See JUDGES' LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Zhonghua Ren-
min Gonghe Guo Faguan Fa) (adopted at the 12
tf meeting of the Standing Committee of the
Eighth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on Feb. 28, 1995,
promulgated by order No. 38 of the President of the People's Republic of China on July 1,
1995 and effective as of that date) art. 9(6) (PRC); PRC Public Procurators Law, art. 10(6).
1 Current Chinese law does not appear to contain any prohibitions against the unau-
thorized practice of law by those not trained in the law or without professional legal knowl-
edge.
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of making awards based upon the counterfeiter's profits. The alternative
method of determining damages would require an evaluation of losses suf-
fered by the brand owner in the form of lost sales revenues, and expectation
and consequential damages. These are not evaluations that most AIC en-
forcement officials, who are not legally trained, would feel comfortable in
undertaking. Although not legally trained, AIC officials are expected to
hand down administrative decisions interpreting trademark law and ren-
dering final judgment in cases brought against counterfeiters.
The frequent work of persons without legal training in performing dif-
ficult legal tasks such as interpretation of laws and deciding issues of evi-
dence offers an additional explanation why effective enforcement against
counterfeiting is difficult to achieve. Assigning legal tasks to those without
legal training may have posed fewer problems under China's pre-reform
economy;' 6 China's developing economy has now given rise to increas-
ingly sophisticated economic crimes and torts with correspondingly more
complex legal issues of evidence, proof, and liability. Many enforcement
officials may not have the training, knowledge, or skills to handle properly
these more sophisticated legal tasks. For the longer term, China needs to
consider whether to recruit-more lawyers into its administrative and en-
forcement systems or to distribute work in a different manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the area of enforcement against counterfeiting, the crucial issues for
China now lie not in the enactment of new laws, but in the interpretation
and application of existing laws. In this area there continue to be a number
of significant issues that frustrate foreign and local brand owners in China.
Some of these issues-such as proof of criminal liability through indirect
and circumstantial evidence and the measure of compensatory damages-
appear to test the capacity of China's developing enforcement system to
deal with increasingly sophisticated legal issues that are a necessary
outgrowth of China's rapid economic and commercial development.
Additional training for PRC enforcement entities in this area and
consideration of practices by other nations, such as those of the United
States, may result in some improvement of these problems.
1 6China's legal system did not play an important role during China's pre-reform econ-
omy where market transactions were rare. Indeed, China abolished its legal system alto-
gether during the chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution and only began to resuscitate the
legal system in 1978, in order to support the new reforms. For a first-hand account of the
Cultural Revolution and its effects on Chinese institutions, see GAO YUAN, BORN RED: A
CHRONICLE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1987). For an account of the history of China's
legal community, see Alison W. Conner, Training China's Early Modern Lawyers: Soochow
University Law School, 8 J. CHrNESE L. 1 (1994); Yujie Gu, Entering the Chinese Legal
Market: A Guide for American Lawyers Interested in Practicing Law in China, 48 DRAKE L.
REv. 173 (1999).
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The Chinese enforcement system also exhibits a number of systemic
problems relating to the division of power among enforcement entities, ad-
ministrative bodies, and the police, prosecutors, and the courts. These sys-
temic issues can also be traced to the Chinese government's struggle to use
existing pre-reform government and regulatory structures to keep pace with
new economic activities introduced as a result of recent reforms. Address-
ing both of these types of issues-interpretation and enforcement and sys-
temic issues in the age of reform-should not only help to improve the
effectiveness of legal enforcement against counterfeiting, but also help to
improve the overall development of China's legal and regulatory system for
the future. While some of these changes will improve China's legal system
and, in the long term, serve China's national interests, reform in the world's
most massive government bureaucracy may not be easy to accomplish.
China has complex and massive political and legal systems with many
competing interests and segments that are resistant to change which may re-
sult in a redistribution and diminution of power and resources. As a result,
it cannot be predicted whether and when China will recognize the benefits
of making the appropriate adjustments, and begin the task of implementing
changes and addressing some of the issues raised in this Article that will
lead to more effective enforcement against counterfeiting.11 7 Obtaining
China's political commitment to address these issues and to crackdown on
the world's most serious counterfeiting problem is the crucial and difficult
task for brand owners in China-and around the world-in the years ahead.
1
7 The critical issue is one of political will. For a discussion of the issue of political will
and the social and political costs involved in any serious national crackdown against counter-
feiting, see Chow, supra note 1, at 39-52.
